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S P E C I A L

E D U C A T I O N

Forest Grove: Parents of Special Needs
Students May Be Reimbursed
for Private School Tuition
by Jay E. Grenig

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 466–470. © 2009 American Bar Association.

In recent years, and again during the past term,
the Supreme Court has begun to look at the rights
of an important population of children, those with
disabilities. First, the Court considered two special education cases during the 2006 and 2007
terms. Declaring that Spending Clause legislation
that attaches conditions to a state’s acceptance of
federal funds must provide clear notice of conditions, the Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that a
non-attorney expert’s fees for services rendered to
prevailing parents in an Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) action are not
“costs” recoverable from the state under the
IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006). Later, in Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550
U.S. 516 (2007), the Supreme Court held that
because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are
entitled to prosecute the IDEA claims on their
own behalf. In the 2009 term, the Supreme Court
decided a third special education case, this time
regarding parents’ right to reimbursement for private education tuition under the IDEA (20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1482).
The IDEA seeks to ensure that all disabled children have access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). While the IDEA does not require
public schools to maximize the potential of dis-
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abled children, they must provide such children
with meaningful access to education. A FAPE
under the IDEA must include special education
and related services tailored to meet the unique
needs of a particular child and must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.
The IDEA does not require a school district
“to pay for the cost of education, including
special education and related services, of a
child with a disability at a private school or
facility if that agency [usually the school district]
made a free appropriate publication available to
the child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school or facility.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(C)(i). However, if a public school
fails in its obligation under the IDEA to provide a
FAPE to a disabled child, the parents may enroll
the child in a private school and seek reimbursement from the school district for the cost of the
private school. This can be done without the consent of the public school if the child “previously
received special education and related services
under the authority of the district.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(C)(ii).
Nevertheless, this wasn’t a settled issue, and up
until this most recent Supreme Court term,
remained in flux. Prior to 1997, the IDEA was
silent with regard to private school reimbursement, but courts had granted such reimbursement
as “appropriate” relief under principles of equity
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C), which provides that a court “shall grant such relief as the
court determines appropriate” for violation of the
IDEA. See School Committee of Town of
Burlington v. Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359
(1985); see also Florence County School Dist. 4 v.
Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). Congress
amended the IDEA in 1997 to include a new section entitled “Payment for education of children

Issue No. 8

enrolled in private schools without consent of
or referral by the public agency.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C). Clause (ii) of the new statutory
section states:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who
previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency, enroll the child in a private elementary
school or secondary school without the consent
of or referral by the public agency, a court or a
hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that
the agency had not made a free appropriate
public education available to the child in a
timely manner prior to that enrollment.
Even with this new statutory language, the circuit
courts of appeal have still been split regarding
reimbursement for private school tuition. The
Second Circuit ruled that, when a student’s enrollment in private school was appropriate for his
needs, the IDEA did not preclude reimbursement
although the student had not previously received
special education and related services from public
schools. Frank G. v. Board of Education of Hyde
Park, 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). The Eleventh
Circuit, in M.M. v. School Board of Miami-Dade
County, 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006), held
that a school district’s “[s]ole reliance on the fact
that [a child] never attended public school was
legally insufficient to deny reimbursement under
§ 1412(a)(10) (C)(ii)” because of the broad equitable powers of courts and hearing officers under
20 U.S.C. § 1415. The court stated that “even
when a child has never enrolled in a public
school, reimbursement is proper if the School
Board [has] failed to offer a sufficient IEP and
in turn, a FAPE.”
In Greenland School District v. Amy N., 358 F.3d
150, 159-60 (1st Cir. 2004), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit observed that
“tuition reimbursement is only available for children who have previously received ‘special education and related services’ while in the public
school (or perhaps those who at least timely
requested such services while the child is in public school.” However, in that case, the parents
removed their daughter from public school and
placed her in private school “without ever before
raising with the school officials the issue of special
education services for [their daughter].”

On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit took a
different view. In Forest Grove School District v.
T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth
Circuit held that students who have not
previously received special education services
are nonetheless eligible for tuition reimbursement
under an IDEA provision (20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)
(2)(C)) authorizing appropriate relief.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in
Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 2009 WL
1738644 (U.S. June 22, 2009). The Supreme
Court had previously declined to grant certiorari
in the Second Circuit’s Hyde Park decision even
though it presented the same issue as Forest
Grove. However, Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Hyde Park certiorari decision whereas
he joined the majority in Forest Grove.
The case is a compelling story of a set of parents’
persistent efforts to deal with the myriad problems of an adolescent son. T.A. attended public
schools in the Forest Grove School District (the
District) from the time he was in kindergarten
through the winter of his junior year of high
school. From kindergarten through eighth grade,
T.A.’s teachers observed he had trouble paying
attention in class and completing his assignments.
When T.A. entered high school, his difficulties
increased.
In December 2000, during T.A.’s freshman year,
his mother contacted the school counselor to discuss T.A.’s problems with his schoolwork. At the
end of the school year, a school psychologist evaluated T.A. After interviewing T.A., examining his
school records, and administering cognitive ability
tests, the psychologist concluded T.A. did not
need further testing for any learning disabilities or
other health impairments, including attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The psychologist and two other school officials discussed
the evaluation results with T.A.’s mother in June
2001, and all agreed T.A. did not qualify for special education services. T.A.’s parents did not seek
review of that decision.
With extensive help from his family, T.A. completed his sophomore year at Forest Grove High
School, but his problems worsened the following
year. In February 2003, T.A.’s parents discussed
with the school district the possibility of T.A.’s
completing high school through a partnership program with the local community college. They also
(Continued on Page 468)
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sought private professional advice, and in March
2003 T.A. was diagnosed with ADHD and a number of disabilities related to learning and memory.
Advised by the private specialist that T.A. would
do best in a structured, residential learning environment, T.A.’s parents enrolled him in a private
academy focused on educating children with
special needs.
Four days after enrolling T.A. in private school,
T.A.’s parents hired a lawyer to determine their
rights and to give the District written notice of
T.A.’s private placement. A few weeks later, in
April 2003, T.A.’s parents requested an administrative due process hearing regarding T.A.’s eligibility for special education services. In June 2003,
the District engaged a school psychologist to assist
in determining whether T.A. had a disability that
significantly interfered with his educational performance. T.A.’s parents cooperated with the
District during the evaluation process. In July
2003, a multidisciplinary team met to discuss
whether T.A. satisfied the IDEA’s disability criteria
and concluded he did not because his ADHD did
not have a sufficiently significant adverse impact
on his educational performance. The District
maintained that T.A. was not eligible for special
education services and therefore it declined to
provide an individualized education program
(IEP). (An IEP is an education plan tailored to a
child’s unique needs that is designed by the
school district in consultation with the child’s parents after the child is identified as eligible for special education services.)
T.A.’s parents consequently kept him enrolled at
the private academy for his senior year.
The administrative review process resumed in
September 2003, when T.A.’s parents brought the
case before a hearing officer to challenge the
District’s decision to classify T.A. as being ineligible for special education services and asking for
reimbursement for the private school tuition.
After considering the parties’ evidence, including
the testimony of numerous experts, the hearing
officer issued a decision in January 2004 finding
that T.A.’s ADHD adversely affected his educational performance and that the District had failed to
meet its obligations under the IDEA by not identifying T.A. as a student eligible for special education services. Because the District did not offer
T.A. a FAPE and his private school placement was
appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer
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ordered the District to reimburse T.A.’s parents
for the cost of the private school tuition.
The District in turn sought judicial review, arguing the hearing officer erred in granting reimbursement. The district court accepted the hearing officer’s findings of fact but set aside the reimbursement award after finding that the IDEA 1997
amendments categorically bar reimbursement of
private school tuition for students who have not
“previously received special education and related
services under the authority of a public agency.”
The district court further held that, “[e]ven
assuming that tuition reimbursement may be
ordered in an extreme case for a student not
receiving special education services, under general principles of equity where the need for special
education was obvious to school authorities,” the
facts of this case do not support equitable relief.
T.A.’s parents appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded for further proceedings,
noting that, prior to the 1997 Amendments,
“IDEA was silent on the subject of private school
reimbursement, but courts had granted such
reimbursement as ‘appropriate’ relief under
principles of equity pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C).” Forest Grove School District v.
T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008). The court
then held that the amendments do not impose a
categorical bar to reimbursement when a parent
unilaterally places in private school a child who
has not previously received special education services through the public school. Rather, such students “are eligible for reimbursement, to the same
extent as before the 1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’ relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).”
The court of appeals also rejected the district
court’s analysis of the equities as resting on two
legal errors. First, because the district court found
that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) generally bars relief in
these circumstances, the court of appeals held
that the district court was wrong when it stated
that relief was appropriate only if the equities
were sufficient to “override” that statutory limitation. According to the court of appeals, the district court also erred in asserting that reimbursement is limited to “extreme” cases. The court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to reexamine the equities,
including the failure of T.A.’s parents to notify the
District before removing T.A. from public school.
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted the District’s
petition for review. Reversing the Ninth Circuit,
the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 vote, held that the
1997 amendments to the IDEA did not categorically bar reimbursement of private education
tuition where a child had not previously received
special education and related services.
The Court began by examining School Committee
of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass.,
471 U.S. 359 (1996). In that case, a father challenged the appropriateness of the IEP developed
for his child by public school officials. His child
had previously received special education services
through the public school. While administrative
review was pending, private specialists advised the
father that his child would do best in a specialized
private educational setting. The father enrolled
his child in private school without the school district’s consent. The hearing officer concluded the
IEP was not adequate to meet the child’s educational needs and the school district had failed to
provide the child a FAPE. Finding also that the
private school placement was appropriate under
IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse the father for the cost of the
private school tuition.
At that time, the IDEA made no express reference
to the possibility of reimbursement, but instead
authorized a court to “grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate.” In determining
the scope of the relief authorized, the Court noted
that “the ordinary meaning of these words confers
broad discretion on the court” and that, absent
any indication to the contrary, what relief is
“appropriate” must be determined in light of the
Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through publicly funded private school placements when necessary.
Accordingly, the Court held that the provision’s
grant of authority includes “the power to order
school authorities to reimburse parents for their
expenditures on private special-education services
if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under
the Act.”
The Court in Forest Grove observed that its decision in Burlington rested in part on the fact that
administrative and judicial review of a parent’s
complaint often takes years. The Burlington
Court concluded that, having mandated that participating states provide a FAPE for every student,

Congress could not have intended to require parents to either accept an inadequate public school
education pending adjudication of their claim or
bear the cost of a private education if the court
ultimately determined that the private placement
was proper under the Act. See also Florence
County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7
(1993) (holding that reimbursement may be
appropriate even when a child is placed in a private school that has not been approved by the
state).
The Forest Grove Court did contrast the present
dispute from those in Burlington and Carter.
According to the Court, Forest Grove concerned
not the adequacy of a proposed IEP, but the
District’s complete failure to provide an IEP to
begin with. The Court noted that, unlike T.A., the
children in the earlier cases had previously
received public special education services.
According to the Court, when a child requires
special education services, a school district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as
serious a violation of its responsibilities under the
IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP.
Because of this, the Court said it was clear that
the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies
equally to this case—the only question being
whether the 1997 amendments required a different result.
According to the Court, the 1997 amendments do
not expressly prohibit reimbursement under the
given circumstances, and the District offered no
evidence that Congress intended to supersede the
decisions in Burlington and Carter. The Court
explained that the amendment explicitly bars
reimbursement only when a school district makes
a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child
as having a disability and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs. According to the
Court, the amendments say nothing to prohibit
reimbursement when a school district fails to
make a FAPE available altogether.
The Court said its reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C)
was necessary to avoid the conclusion that
Congress abrogated sub silentio (without notice)
the Court’s decisions in Burlington and Carter. In
coming to its decision in Forest Grove, the Court
pointed out that it construed the IDEA to authorize reimbursement when a school district fails to
provide a FAPE and a child’s private school placement is appropriate, without regard to the child’s
(Continued on Page 470)
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prior receipt of services in Burlington and Carter.
The Court further declared that it would take
more than Congress’s failure to comment on the
category of cases in which a child has not previously received special education services for the
Court to conclude that the amendments substantially superseded the Court’s decisions and in
large part repealed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
The Court also pointed out that the Department
of Education (the Department), the agency
charged with implementing the IDEA, has adopted
T.A.’s reading of the Act. The Court pointed out
that, in commentary to regulations implementing
the 1997 amendments, the Department stated
that hearing officers and courts retain their
authority, recognized in Burlington to award
appropriate relief if a public agency has failed to
provide a FAPE, including reimbursement in
instances in which the child has not yet received
special education and related services.
By immunizing a school district’s refusal to
find a child eligible for special education services
no matter how compelling the child’s need, the
Court reasoned the District’s interpretation of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) would produce a rule bordering
on the irrational. According to the Court, it would
be particularly strange for the Act to provide a
remedy when a school district offers a child inadequate special education services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation
in which the school district unreasonably denies a
child access to such services altogether.
The Court concluded that the IDEA authorizes
reimbursement for the cost of private special education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private school placement is
appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education or related services through the public school. When a court or
hearing officer concludes that a school district
failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement was suitable, the Supreme Court said court
or hearing officer must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents
and the school district’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s private education is warranted. The Court declared
that the district court had not properly considered the equities in this case and will need to
undertake that analysis on remand.
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In response, the dissenting justices emphasized
that the costs of special education can be incredibly expensive, amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually and as much as 20 percent of public
schools’ general operating budgets. The more private placement there is, the higher a district’s special education bill.
The majority acknowledged the expense of special
education, but stressed that parents are entitled
to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public school placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was
proper under the IDEA. The majority pointed out
that the incidence of private school placement at
public expense is quite small. And further, according to the majority, courts still retain discretion to
reduce the amount of a reimbursement award if
the equities so warrant—for instance, if the parents failed to give the school district adequate
notice of their intent to enroll the child in private
school. The Court said that, in considering the
equities, courts should generally presume that
public school officials are properly performing
their obligations under the IDEA. The Court
warned that, as a result of these criteria and the
fact that parents who unilaterally change their
child’s placement during the pendency of review
proceedings, without the consent of state or local
school officials, do so at their own financial risk.
Will Forest Grove result in numerous claims for
private education costs? Possibly not. First, the
parents must have the financial resources to pay
the private school tuition to begin with. Second,
the parents must be able to show (1) the public
school placement violated the IDEA and (2) the
private school placement was proper under the
IDEA. If the parents are able to do this, a court or
hearing officer must still consider all relevant factors, including (1) the notice provided by the parents and (2) the school district’s opportunities for
evaluating the child, in determining whether
reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the
child’s private education is warranted. Whether
the Court will continue to take an active role in
defining the rules governing special education also
remains to be seen.

Issue No. 8

